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Emerging research suggests that people infer that common behaviors are moral and vice versa. 
The studies presented here investigated the role of group membership in inferences regarding 
commonality and morality. In Study 1, participants expected a target character to infer that 
behaviors that were common among their ingroup were particularly moral. However, the extent 
to which behaviors were common among the target character’s outgroup did not influence 
expectations regarding perceptions of morality. Study 2 reversed this test, finding that 
participants expected a target character to infer that behaviors considered moral among their 
ingroup were particularly common, regardless of how moral their outgroup perceived those 
behaviors to be. While Studies 1-2 relied on fictitious behaviors performed by novel groups, 
Studies 3-4 generalized these results to health behaviors performed by members of different 
racial groups. When answering from another person’s perspective (Study 3) and from their own 
perspective (Study 4), participants reported that the more common behaviors were among their 
ingroup, the more moral those behaviors were. This effect was significantly weaker for 
perceptions regarding outgroup norms, although outgroup norms did exert some effect in this 
real-world context. Taken together, these results highlight the complex integration of ingroup 
and outgroup norms in socio-moral cognition.   
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Sensitivity to Ingroup and Outgroup Norms in the Association Between Commonality and 
Morality 
Enlightenment thinker David Hume noted that people conflate ‘what is common’ and 
‘what is moral’ (Hume, 1738/2003). Nearly 300 years later, a rich body of empirical evidence 
substantiates Hume’s observation. When told that a behavior is common, people infer that it is 
moral (Lindström, Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018), and when told that a behavior is moral, 
people infer that it is common (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015). Perceptions of 
commonality and morality are inextricably linked (Bear & Knobe, 2017).  
Of course, what is considered common and what is considered moral depends heavily on 
the social group to which a person belongs (Costa, Terraciano, & McCrae, 2001; Heinrichs et al., 
2006; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015; Mu, Kitayama, Han, & Gelfand, 2015; Roos, Gelfand, 
Nau, & Lun, 2015; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis 1998). For example, 7- to 9-year-old children 
and adults only say it is okay for a fictitious group, Glerks, to drink juice out of a bowl when 
other Glerks drink juice out of a bowl, but not when Hibbles do (Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2019). 
Similarly, adults only think strangers from a faraway land would say that a behavior is common 
when those people believe that the behavior is moral (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015). 
Some existing research on the association between commonality and morality therefore 
acknowledges that normative reasoning is inherently group-based, showing that people (Abrams, 
Rutland & Cameron, 2003; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) and their behaviors (Rhodes & Chalik, 
2013; Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2018; Roberts, Guo, Ho & Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & 
Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2019) are devalued insofar as they violate the norms of 
their own group.  
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Interestingly, this prior work has focused on the effects of commonality and morality for 
behaviors that are perfectly differentiated by group status. In these studies, behaviors are 
depicted as common either among the ingroup or the outgroup, but never both (i.e. Abrams, 
Rutland & Cameron, 2003; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013; Roberts, Gelman, 
& Ho, 2018; Roberts, Guo, Ho & Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & 
Gelman, 2019). Similarly, some work has depicted behaviors as moral among a person’s ingroup 
without providing information about outgroup norms (Eriksson et. al, 2015).  
Together, this research highlights that ingroup norms govern socio-moral cognition. 
However, behaviors are rarely differentiated so strictly by group membership in the world 
outside the lab. Instead, behaviors can be common or uncommon among both ingroup and 
outgroup members. For example, getting the flu shot is most common among Asian-Americans, 
although people from other racial groups certainty also get the flu shot (U.S. Center for Disease 
Control, 2016). This raises the question: Would Asian-Americans consider getting the flu shot to 
be especially moral if they perceived that it was relatively common among both Asian-
Americans and outgroup members? Or would Asian-Americans perceive the flu shot to be more 
moral if they knew that it was common among their ingroup but less common among their 
outgroup?  In other words, if ingroup norms are held constant, to what extent do people 
incorporate outgroup norms when reasoning from commonality to morality and vice versa? The 
answers to these questions depend on the extent to which people are sensitive to outgroup norms. 
Interestingly, different psychological theories predict different outcomes.  
Psychological Theories in Support of Outgroup Sensitivity  
 One possibility is that people are sensitive to outgroup norms such that the link between 
commonality and morality depends on outgroup norms as well as ingroup norms. This 
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hypothesis stems from work on the ‘common is moral’ heuristic and on intergroup bias, although 
these two literatures differ in exactly how they expect outgroup norms to matter.  
Work on the ‘common is moral’ heuristic leverages methods from cognitive psychology 
to show that people infer morality from commonality (the common is moral hypothesis). In 
speeded reaction-time tasks, perceptions of commonality predict perceptions of morality so 
quickly that those inferences are presumed to take place below the level of conscious awareness 
(Lindström et al., 2018). Generalizing this finding across groups implies that people may 
perceive behaviors to be the most moral when the largest number of individuals engage in those 
behaviors, which would occur when people from multiple groups enact them. Indeed, certain 
behaviors that are prevalent across cultures are considered to be universally moral, such as 
avoiding purposeful harm to others (Haidt, 2013). By the same token, people may presume that 
behaviors that multiple groups perceive as moral are particularly common. In line with this 
notion, people believe others are fundamentally moral ‘deep down inside’ (De Freitas & Cikara, 
2018; Heiphetz, Strohminger, Gelman, & Young, 2018; Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014). In 
line with this work, people may perceive even outgroup members as morally good and expect 
them to engage in moral behaviors (De Freitas & Cikara, 2018). Accordingly, perceiving that 
both ingroup and outgroup members view a behavior as moral might increase the degree to 
which it is perceived as common.  
Research from the intergroup cognition literature also supports the hypothesis that people 
are sensitive to outgroup information in their norm-based reasoning, but in a way that further 
differentiates, rather than unites, judgments for behaviors across groups (the group 
differentiation hypothesis). Social Identity Theory posits that people are motivated to distinguish 
between their own group and other groups as a way to develop and maintain a positive image of 
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themselves and their ingroup (Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979). As such, people 
perceive ingroup members as more warm, competent, and moral than outgroup members (Abele 
et al., 2016; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Fiske, 2018). From this perspective, a behavior that is 
common among one’s ingroup would only be considered moral if the outgroup does not engage 
in that behavior. This perception would allow people to leverage normative differences between 
ingroups and outgroups in order to perceive their own group as most moral. Such a finding 
would align with the fact that people act more in line with ingroup norms when they are primed 
to think of the outgroup (Hall & Crisp, 2008). People might therefore perceive behaviors that are 
considered moral among their ingroup but not their outgroup as the most common.  
Psychological Theory Opposed to Outgroup Sensitivity  
An alternative possibility is that inferences about commonality based on morality, and 
inferences about morality based on commonality, are not sensitive to outgroup norms (i.e., the 
perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis). People are highly attuned to others’ attitudes, but 
such sensitivity may pertain mostly to ingroup opinions (Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli, & Rumiati, 
2013). Thus, information about outgroup norms may not play a strong role in participants’ 
inferences. In a direct test of this hypothesis, Smith and Louis (2008) found a significant 
interaction between moral and common norms that did not depend on the outgroup. In their 
Study 2, participants were more likely to adopt a behavior when an ingroup member engaged in 
it, regardless of whether outgroup members performed that behavior. However, this study only 
examined the association between commonality and morality for attitudes and behaviors that had 
nothing to do with the outgroup. Specifically, this study tested whether students were more likely 
to support and sign a petition about their own school when other students in their school signed it 
and whether this effect was moderated by the number of signatures obtained from students at 
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another school. In such a context, outgroup norms may have seemed irrelevant because the 
effects of the passed petition had no bearing on students in another school. In many real-world 
contexts, however, perceptions of morality and commonality do have implications for outgroup 
members.  
The current studies investigated whether people incorporate outgroup information for 
behaviors and attitudes that are relevant to members of multiple groups within a society. We 
examined whether behaviors that were common among both the ingroup and the outgroup are 
perceived as the most moral (in line with the common is moral hypothesis) or whether behaviors 
that are common among the ingroup but not the outgroup are perceived as most moral (in line 
with the group differentiation hypothesis). We simultaneously probe whether behaviors that are 
common among the ingroup are perceived as moral, regardless of how common they are among 
the outgroup (in line with the outgroup irrelevance hypothesis). Importantly, we reverse these 
tests by examining the interactive effects of ingroup and outgroup members’ perceptions of 
morality on inferences about commonality.  
Generalizability of the Link Between Commonality and Morality 
 As discussed above, prior work leads to competing predictions about whether outgroup 
norms matter for participants’ own judgments. In addition to testing between these hypotheses, 
the current work extended prior literature by investigating the generalizability of the perception 
that common behaviors are moral and vice versa. 
First, we varied the perspective of the perceiver, asking participants to make judgments 
on behalf of another person (third person perspective) as well as themselves (first person 
perspective). In a number of domains, people expect the third person perspective to differ from 
the first person perspective, with others making judgments differently than they themselves do. 
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For example, people expect their own judgments to be unbiased but expect other people’s 
judgments to be wrought with fallacies (Pronin, 2008). However, in the moral domain, people’s 
own judgments may align closely with the judgments they expect others to make. Indeed, some 
have argued that a defining feature of moral norms is their universality (Smetana, 2006), which 
implies that a norm can only qualify as moral if people expect everyone—including themselves 
and others—to perceive it as such. Unlike other domains in which people presume that others 
form distinct judgments from themselves, the moral domain may be one in which people expect 
others to make the same types of judgments as themselves. To disambiguate these possibilities, 
we tested the extent to which people’s expectations regarding others’ use of group-based 
information in norm-based judgments (Studies 1-3) generalized to their own judgments (Study 
4). 
Second, we tested the extent to which judgments regarding novel groups performing 
fictitious behaviors (Studies 1-2) generalized to judgments regarding racial groups performing 
health-related behaviors (Studies 3-4). In contrast to prior studies that tested behaviors that were 
either fictitious (e.g., “phooshing”; Errikson et al., 2015; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) or performed 
by stick figures or novel groups (e.g. “Glerks”; Lindström et al., 2018; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013; 
Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2018; Roberts, Guo, Ho & Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 
2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2019), Studies 3-4 asked participants about racial groups and 
health behaviors. We chose race as a marker of group membership and health behavior as a 
domain for moral judgments for several reasons. Race is one of the “big three” categories that 
elicit spontaneous group categorization, and these identities are particularly influential in many 
social contexts (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1998). Since health behaviors frequently vary by racial 
group (Williams & Collins, 2001), these behaviors provide an apt context in which to study the 
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role of group membership in moral judgments, especially since people often moralize health-
related behaviors by perceiving some (e.g. exercise) as morally good and others (e.g. illicit drug 
use) as morally bad (Brandt & Rozin, 2013).  
Furthermore, the use of racial groups and health behaviors has important social 
consequences. Policy-makers and politicians often rely on public perceptions of behaviors, such 
as whether using a certain drug should be harshly penalized or whether funding should support 
the availability of certain foods in schools (Cohen, Tsfati, & Sheafer, 2008). Oftentimes, these 
decisions are bolstered by moralized arguments for or against these behaviors (Husak, 2004; 
Powers, Faden, & Faden, 2006). Thus, the current studies make important translational 
contributions.  
Overview of Current Studies 
 Two experiments (Studies 1-2) and two correlational studies (Studies 3-4) tested whether 
people are sensitive to outgroup norms when inferring the morality of behaviors based on their 
commonality among the ingroup and vice versa. The first two studies used fictitious behaviors 
and novel groups in an effort to isolate the unique effects of outgroup and ingroup norms on 
judgments. The second two studies used racial groups and health behaviors in order to generalize 
findings from the first two studies. Additionally, Studies 1-3 asked about participants’ 
expectations regarding other people’s inferences, while Study 4 probed participants’ own 
inferences.   
An overview of the study designs can be found in Table 1. We disclose all measures,1 
manipulations, and exclusions, as well as the method of determining the final sample size. All 
studies include samples of United States residents. We conducted a priori power analyses prior to 
                                                
1 All measures are uploaded to the following OSF repository: 
https://osf.io/g3z6y/?view_only=6ce1a8a6236a4b0cb5c3d4930c7076bb. No analyses were conducted on measures 
not included in this paper.  
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collecting data for all studies except Study 4, which was the first study we ran in this series. We 
also conducted post hoc sensitivity analyses, which are discussed below.  
Table 1 
 
Overview of Study Designs 
Research 
Question 
Design Perspective Target Main Finding 
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Study 1: Are participants sensitive to outgroup norms when using commonality to infer 
morality? 
 The purpose of Study 1 was to replicate prior findings showing that perceptions of 
commonality lead to perceptions of morality (e.g., Eriksson et al., 2015; Lindstrom et al., 2018). 
We also extended this past work by testing whether the strength of this effect differed depending 
on the behavioral commonly among both ingroup and outgroup members.  
Methods 
Participants. We conducted a power analysis prior to data collection for a 2x2 factorial 
ANOVA with alpha=.05, power=0.80, and an effect size of 0.25 (a conservative estimate; 
Lakens, 2013), which yielded a sample of 512 participants. Due to participants frequently failing 
attention checks, to sampling contamination on Amazon Mechanical Turk described elsewhere 
(Rouse, 2015), and to potential drawbacks of conducting power analyses where the numerator 
degrees of freedom for the main effect equals the numerator degrees of freedom for the 
interaction (Giner-Sorolla, 2018), we over-recruited and consented 1,069 people into the study. 
Participants were screened out if they failed to answer simple attention check questions correctly 
(i.e. ‘to which social group does this person belong?’); therefore, 867 people completed the 
study. Data from an additional 70 respondents were excluded because they provided an 
implausible short-response answer at the end (i.e. ‘please write in the provided space one of the 
questions we asked throughout the study’). Here and in all subsequent studies, analyses including 
all respondents revealed similar patterns of results as those reported below; see Supplementary 
Materials. Of the remaining 806 people in the sample used for final analyses, 54% identified as 
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female and 46% identified as male; 72% identified as White, 9% identified as Black, and 8% 
identified as Asian; 8% identified as Hispanic or Latinx; and the mean age was 39 years with a 
range of 18-78 years. Participants received $0.20 for completing the 3-minute study. 
Procedure. Participants learned that a fictitious target person belonged to one of two 
novel groups that lived on a faraway planet. Participants were then randomized into one of four 
conditions. In the ingroup-common/outgroup-uncommon condition, participants learned that the 
target person’s ingroup members commonly engage in a fictitious behavior and that the target 
person’s outgroup members do not commonly engage in that behavior. For example, participants 
read: “There are two groups of people on Planet Teeku, the Blarks [ingroup] and the Orps 
[outgroup]. Joop [target person] is a Blark. On Planet Teeku, Barks flirb [behavior] and Orps do 
not.” The full narrative structure can be found in the Supplementary Materials. Participants then 
indicated how moral, praiseworthy, and positive Joop thought it was to flirb. These three items 
were taken from Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Salovey (2003) and combined into a single scale of 
morality, where 1=extremely immoral and 9=extremely moral. All conditions proceeded in this 
way, such that the ingroup-common/outgroup-common condition contained a common behavior 
for both the ingroup and the outgroup, the ingroup-uncommon/outgroup-common condition 
contained a behavior that was uncommon for the ingroup but common for the outgroup, and 
ingroup-uncommon/outgroup-uncommon condition contained a behavior that was uncommon in 
both groups. All participants answered a few final demographic questions, were thanked, and 
received payment for their time.    
Results 
A 2 (Ingroup: common vs. uncommon) x 2 (Outgroup: common vs. uncommon) 
between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect for Ingroup (F(2, 801)=759.10, p<.001, 
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ηp2=0.49), indicating that ratings of morality differed based on how commonly the target 
person’s ingroup members performed the behavior. As can be seen in Figure 1, participants 
expected targets to perceive behaviors as more moral when they were common (M=6.92, 
SD=1.66), rather than uncommon (M=3.40, SD=1.93), for the target’s ingroup. However, the 
omnibus ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of Outgroup (F(2, 801)=2.84 p=0.092, ηp2=0.004) 
nor an Ingroup x Outgroup interaction (F(2, 801)=0.59, p=.443, ηp2=.001). These findings 
indicate that the present study did not detect an effect of outgroup norms on perceptions of 
morality. Post hoc sensitivity analyses revealed that with 80% power, an alpha error probability 
of 0.05, and a sample size of 806, we would have been able to detect an effect of 0.10, well 
below our observed effect.  
To better understand how participants reasoned about ingroup versus outgroup norms, we 
ran simple contrasts to test for differences between conditions in which the ingroup norm 
remained constant and the outgroup norm varied. The first test compared means for behaviors 
that were common for the ingroup but either common or uncommon for the outgroup. This test 
revealed that morality ratings when behaviors were common for both the ingroup and the 
outgroup (M=6.97, SD=1.45) did not significantly differ from morality ratings when behaviors 
were common for the ingroup but uncommon for the outgroup (M=6.86, SD=1.88; p=0.517). 
Importantly, the 95% confidence interval for the difference was narrow, ranging from -0.47 to 
+0.47 on a 9-point scale. This implies that the difference in the population was estimated to be at 
most 0.47 in absolute terms, an amount so small as to suggest that behaviors that were common 
among the ingroup corresponded to greater perceptions of morality, regardless of whether or not 
the behavior was common among the outgroup. The second test compared behaviors that were 
uncommon for the ingroup but varied for the outgroup. Similarly to the previous assessment, 
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morality ratings for behaviors that were uncommon among both the ingroup and the outgroup 
(M=3.57, SD=1.91) did not significantly differ from morality ratings for behaviors that were 
uncommon among the ingroup but common among the outgroup (M=3.25, SD=1.94; p=0.082), 
with a narrow 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.66 to +0.66. Given that the confidence 
interval includes only very small effects, it appears that outgroup commonality had, at most, a 
trivial effect on perceptions of morality when behaviors were uncommon for the ingroup.  
 
Figure 1: Perceptions of moral valence based on commonality, Study 1. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 Study 1 tested the extent to which participants expected a target person to view fictitious 
behaviors as moral on the basis of the behavior’s commonality among that target person’s 
ingroup and outgroup members. These results provide the strongest support for the perceived 
outgroup irrelevance hypothesis, which proposes that information about outgroups does not 
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inform participants’ judgments. Such findings imply that the common is moral hypothesis does 
not apply across groups, as behaviors that were common among more groups (and therefore 
more people) were not perceived as the most moral. Similarly, these data do not support the 
group differentiation hypothesis, since participants did not necessarily expect the target person to 
perceive behaviors that were common among the ingroup but not the outgroup to be the most 
moral.  
Study 2: Are participants sensitive to outgroup norms when using morality to infer 
commonality? 
Study 2 sought to test the reverse causal direction. That is, we probed whether 
participants expected others to make inferences regarding commonality on the basis of morality 
and, if so, whether group membership shaped these inferences. Given that most research has 
manipulated commonality and measured morality (for an exception, see Eriksson et al., 2015), 
Study 2 provided insight into the understudied but important question of how perceptions 
regarding morality might influence perceptions regarding commonality. Furthermore, Study 2—
like Study 1—emphasized the relative importance of perceptions regarding ingroup versus 
outgroup norms. 
Methods 
Participants. We used the same a priori power calculation as in Study 1 and aimed to 
recruit a sample of 512 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. To account for potential 
exclusions and issues mentioned in Study 1 with factorial power analyses, we consented 917 
people into the study. As in Study 1, participants were screened out if they failed to answer 
simple attention check questions correctly (i.e. ‘to which social group does this person belong?’); 
therefore, 661 people completed the study. Data from an additional 121 respondents were 
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excluded because these respondents provided an implausible short-response answer at the end 
(i.e. ‘please write in the provided space one of the questions we asked throughout the study’). Of 
the remaining 540 participants included in final analyses, 57% identified as female and 43% 
identified as male; 76% identified as White, 10% identified as Black, and 7% identified as Asian 
American; and 9% identified as Hispanic or Latinx. The mean age was 38 years with a range of 
18-75 years. Participants received $0.20 for taking the 3-minute survey. 
Procedure. The design of this study was identical to Study 1, except that participants 
learned information about morality and rated their expectations regarding another person’s 
perceptions of commonality. In the ingroup-moral/outgroup-immoral condition, participants 
learned that the target person’s ingroup members viewed a fictitious behavior as moral and that 
the person’s outgroup members viewed the behavior as immoral. For example, participants in 
this condition read: “There are two groups of people on Planet Teeku, the Blarks [ingroup] and 
the Orps [outgroup]. Joop [target person] is a Blark. Among Blarks, flirbing [behavior] is 
considered really moral. Among Orps, flirbing is considered really immoral.” Participants then 
indicated how common Joop thought it was to flirb. The remaining conditions were identical 
except that those in the ingroup-moral/outgroup-moral condition learned that both groups 
considered the behavior to be moral, those in the ingroup-immoral/outgroup-moral condition 
learned that the ingroup considered the behavior to be immoral while the outgroup considered 
the behavior to be moral, and those in the ingroup-immoral/outgroup-immoral condition learned 
that both groups viewed the behavior as immoral. All participants then rated how common Joop 
would believe the behavior to be, from 1=Joop believes almost no one engages in the behavior to 
9=Joop believes that almost everyone engages in the behavior. All participants answered a few 
final demographic questions, were thanked, and received payment for their time.    




We followed the same statistical procedures as in Study 1 and found identical conceptual 
results. A 2 (Ingroup: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (Outgroup: moral vs. immoral) between-subjects 
ANOVA revealed a main effect for Ingroup (F(2, 535)=649.32, p<.001, ηp2=0.55), indicating 
that ratings of morality differed based on commonality for the target person’s ingroup. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, participants expected targets to perceive behaviors as more common when they 
were moral (M=7.45, SD=1.70), rather than immoral (M=3.42, SD=1.96), for the target’s 
ingroup. However, the omnibus ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of Outgroup (F(2, 
535)=0.06, p=0.800, ηp2<.001) or an Ingroup x Outgroup interaction (F(2, 535)=.05, p=0.829 
ηp2<.001), suggesting that the present study did not detect an effect of outgroup norms 
influencing perceptions of morality. Post hoc sensitivity analyses revealed that with 80% power, 
an alpha error probability of 0.05, and a sample size of 540, we would have been able to detect 
an effect of 0.12, well below our observed effect.  
Following this main analysis, we again ran simple contrasts to test for differences 
between conditions in which the ingroup norm remained constant and the outgroup norm varied. 
The first test compared means for behaviors that were moral for the ingroup but either moral or 
immoral for the outgroup. This test revealed that behaviors that were considered moral by both 
the ingroup and the outgroup (M=7.48, SD=1.60) did not significantly differ from behaviors that 
were considered moral by the ingroup but immoral by the outgroup (M=7.41, SD=1.78; 
p=0.734). The 95% confidence interval for the difference was relatively narrow, ranging from  
-0.50 to +0.50 on a 9-point scale. This implies that the difference in the population is estimated 
to be at most 0.50 in absolute terms, which is negligible. The second test compared behaviors 
that were immoral for the ingroup but varied for the outgroup. Commonality ratings for 
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behaviors that were considered moral by both the ingroup and the outgroup (M=3.41, SD=1.92) 
did not significantly differ from behaviors that were considered moral by the ingroup but 
immoral by the outgroup (M=3.42, SD=2.01; p=0.979), with a narrow 95% confidence interval 
ranging from -0.46 to +0.46.  With confidence intervals that include only very small effects, it 




Figure 2: Perceptions of moral valence based on commonality, Study 2. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with Study 1, Study 2 supported the perceived outgroup irrelevance 
hypothesis by showing that participants attended to ingroup norms, but not outgroup norms, 
when drawing inferences about the commonality of behaviors. Participants who learned that 
behaviors were considered to be moral among targets’ ingroup members indicated that targets 
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would perceive the behavior to be more common, regardless of perceptions among outgroup 
members. These results suggest that people do not attend to mere consensus about the morality 
of behaviors (i.e. the common is moral hypothesis in reverse); if they did, then participants in the 
ingroup-moral/outgroup-moral condition would expect the target person to view the behavior as 
more common than participants in the ingroup-moral/outgroup-immoral condition. Instead, 
ratings of commonality were almost identical in these two conditions. Finally, these data did not 
support the group differentiation hypothesis, as participants did not necessarily expect the target 
person to perceive behaviors that were considered moral by the ingroup but not the outgroup as 
the most common.   
Studies 1-2 provide several important insights by showing that people expect others to 
use moral norms among their ingroup to formulate notions of commonality and to use 
information about commonality to formulate notions of morality, regardless of outgroup norms. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether these types of judgments persist outside of a novel group 
context. In Studies 1-2, participants only had access to information about perceived commonality 
(Study 1) and morality (Study 2). These studies therefore traded off higher experimental control 
at the expense of external validity, and participants may have agreed that behaviors were moral 
or common because they had no other information on which to judge them. Studies 3-4 therefore 
utilized real-world social groups and behaviors.  
Study 3: Is the strength of the association between commonality and morality stronger for 
a target person’s ingroup than outgroup? 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to test associations between perceived commonality and 
morality for real-world social groups and behaviors. Given that Studies 1-2 revealed the 
bidirectional nature of inferences about commonality and morality, we turned to a correlational 
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design to test associations between these constructs for everyday groups and behaviors. This 
design allowed us to test the bidirectional link between perceptions of commonality and morality 
while avoiding manipulations that would have required deception and may have seemed 
unbelievable to participants, such as telling them that Black people find a particular behavior 
moral while White people find it immoral.  
Methods 
Participants. We conducted an a priori power analysis using SimR, inputting prior data 
that yielded a necessary sample of 250 participants with an 80% power cutoff.2 We over-
recruited 268 participants based on completion rates from the prior studies in this paper and the 
number of participants that our funding allowed us to test. Fifty-four of these participants were 
excluded for failing one or more simple attention-check questions (e.g. a free-response item at 
the end of the survey asking them to remember a question that had been presented to them and an 
image identifier). Of the remaining sample, 52% identified as female and 48% identified as male; 
81% identified as White, 11% identified as Black, and 6% identified as Asian American; and 7% 
identified as Hispanic or Latinx. The mean age was 37 years with a range of 18-70 years.3 
Participants received $0.67 for completing the 10-minute survey. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine a White person named Sam. They then 
learned that they would answer questions about Sam’s beliefs and perceptions of various 
behaviors and that they should do their best to provide the answers that they believed Sam would 
provide. From Sam’s perspective, participants then indicated the percent of White people and 
Black people who engage in 15 different health behaviors (on a sliding scale from 0% to 100%) 
                                                
2 To conduct the power analysis, we used data from Study 4, which we conducted before Study 3.  
3 Because we did not randomly assign participants to condition and because race-related perceptions vary by age, it 
is possible that our observed effects were driven by participants’ age. To address this, we re-ran the analysis 
including age as a covariate and found no effect of age. See Supplementary Materials for more information about 
this analysis. 
INGROUP AND OUTGROUP COMMONALITY AND MORALITY  
 
21 
and reported how moral or immoral Sam would perceive each behavior to be (ranging from 
1=extremely immoral to 9=extremely moral). See Table 2 for a list of all behaviors for Studies 3-
4. Since participants learned that Sam was White, all answers for White people represent ingroup 
beliefs and all answers for Black people represent outgroup beliefs. In order to distract 
participants from our interest in Sam’s supposed perceptions of White compared to Black people 
who engage in each behavior, 35 filler questions asked about other demographic groups, such as 
young people. The order of these questions was randomized within blocks, such that participants 
first rated perceptions of commonality of each behavior among each social category and then 
indicated perceptions of morality of each behavior. All participants answered a few final 
demographic questions, were thanked, and received payment for their time. 
Table 2: Health Behaviors in Studies 3-4 
What percent of [Black/White/filler group] people… 
…sleep at least 7 hours per night, on average? 
…have ever smoked crack cocaine? 
…have smoked marijuana in the past month?  
…consume more than 40% of their calories from calorie dense (junk) foods and drinks? 
…get sufficient exercise (at least 2.5 hrs of moderate or 1.25 hrs of vigorous activity per week)? 
…have ever had risky unprotected sex? 
…have smoked 100 cigarettes or fewer in their lifetime? 
…drink enough water daily (3.7 liters for men and 2.7 liters for women)? 
…east less than one fruit daily? 
…drink alcohol heavily (more than 7 drinks per week [women], or more than 14 drinks per week [men], on 
average, in the past year)? 
…abused prescription opioids in the last year? 
…have ever done heroin? 
…have ever done powder cocaine? 
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…got the flu shot last year? 




Since each person answered 15 questions about the percent of White people who perform 
each behavior, the percent of Black people who perform each behavior, and the moral valence of 
each behavior, the data contained observations nested within participants. This data structure 
necessitated multilevel modeling. We therefore specified and estimated a multilevel mixed 
model using R Statistical software and the nlme package with the default estimation procedure, 
maximum likelihood estimation. In line with established recommendations (Bolger & 
Lauranceau, 2013), we disaggregated the within- and between-person levels of continuous 
variables prior to running the model. Moreover, we estimated random effects for intercepts but 
not for slopes. For interpretability purposes, we re-scaled the morality variable to be between 0 
and 100.  
We regressed ratings of morality on a 0/1 indicator variable for ingroup (1=ingroup), the 
percent of people perceived to perform behaviors (i.e. commonality), and an interaction term 
between ingroup and estimated percents. Since outgroup was coded as zero, the coefficient for 
the percent of people performing each behavior revealed the association between the perceived 
commonality of a behavior among the outgroup and perceived morality; a positive coefficient 
would suggest that participants expected Sam to perceive that behaviors that were more common 
among Sam’s outgroup to also be more moral. The interaction term revealed the additional effect 
of ingroup commonality on perceptions of morality; a positive interaction term would imply that 
the strength of the association between commonality and morality was stronger for ingroup 
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norms than for outgroup norms. We also ran a simple slopes analysis to determine whether the 
association between ingroup commonality and perceptions of morality significantly differed 
from zero.  
Results 
 Results can be found in Table 3, and a visualization can be found in Figure 3. Since 
between-person fixed effects in this setting are not entirely interpretable (e.g. we were not 
interested in differences in morality scores for people who rated all behaviors as more or less 
common than the group mean), we represent and interpret only the within-person fixed effects. 
Results revealed an association between commonality on morality that was moderated by group 
membership. When participants made judgments on behalf of another person, an association 
between outgroup commonality and perceptions of morality emerged. Participants indicated, on 
average, that a 10% increase in the percent of outgroup members who engaged in a behavior was 
associated with an increase of about 2 points out of 100 on the morality scale (b=0.20, p<.001). 
Simple slopes analyses also revealed an association between ingroup commonality and 
perceptions of morality. Participants indicated, on average, that a 10% increase in the percent of 
ingroup members who engaged in a behavior was associated with an increase of about 3 points 
out of 100 on the morality scale (b=0.28, p<.001). This association was significantly stronger 
than that between outgroup commonality and morality (b=0.08, p=.005). In other words, the link 
between perceptions of commonality and morality was slightly positive for outgroup members 
and even more positive for ingroup members. A simulated post-hoc sensitivity analytic approach 
(in the simR package) revealed that with 80% power, an alpha error rate of 0.05, and a sample 
size of 214, we were able to detect an effect as small as 0.08—on par with the effect we observed 
in this study.   
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Table 3: Multilevel Mixed Model, Study 3 
Fixed effects  
(intercept, slopes) 
Estimate SE t 
Intercept 42.72 0.7 63.8** 
Ingroup (1=yes) 0.63 0.7 0.9 
Percent  0.20 0.02 9.2** 




Figure 3: Association between the percent of people perceived to engage in a behavior and that 
behavior’s perceived morality in Study 3, in which participants answered from the viewpoint of 
another person. Each line represents a model-predicted intercept and slope for each person in the 
dataset. Note that the morality index was rescaled to be between 0 and 100. 
 
Discussion 
 The main goal of Study 3 was to test the association between commonality and morality, 
with a specific interest in whether the association was stronger for a target person’s ingroup 
relative to a target person’s outgroup. By asking participants to respond on behalf of another 
person, we gained insight into participants’ expectations of others’ judgments regarding morality 
and commonality. Participants expected another person to perceive behaviors that were more 
common among their outgroup as more moral. This association between commonality and 
morality was stronger for ingroup norms.  
Since commonality and morality were more strongly linked for ingroup versus outgroup 
norms, these data provide some support for the perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis. 
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However, the fact that participants did not completely ignore information about the outgroup 
implies a more tempered interpretation; namely, participants may have perceived the outgroup as 
less relevant rather than as completely irrelevant. Indeed, the fact that outgroup commonality 
correlated with perceptions of morality while holding constant the effect of ingroup commonality 
partially supports the common is moral hypothesis, which proposes that perceptions of 
commonality and morality will be positively associated, which is the case for behaviors common 
among both the ingroup and the outgroup. At the same time, these results provide a third set of 
data (in conjunction with Studies 1-2) that fail to support the group differentiation hypothesis, 
which would predict a shallower slope between outgroup commonality and morality than that 
between ingroup commonality and morality. Taken together, these data suggest a nuanced 
process whereby perceptions regarding outgroup commonality are associated with perceptions of 
morality to some extent, but not as much as perceptions regarding ingroup commonality.  
Despite these contributions to the literature, Study 3 also had several limitations. For 
instance, it is possible that this pattern of results is specific to expectations of other people and 
would not generalize to participants’ own judgments. Further, the sample was largely White, 
which constitutes a limitation for several reasons. First, the proportion of White participants in 
psychology studies is larger than White people’s representation in the population, perhaps due in 
part to the fact that psychological studies are conducted largely by White researchers (Does et 
al., 2018; Roberts, Bareket-Shavit, Dollins, Goldie, & Mortenson, 2020). Although this 
limitation is not specific to Study 3, it is an important one to address so that psychological 
science can better speak to the experiences of diverse groups of people. Second, testing largely 
White participants introduced a potential ambiguity into the results. Because the target person, 
Sam, was described as White, participants responded on behalf of a person for whom ingroup 
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members were high in perceived racial status (Kahn, Ho, Sidanius, & Pratto, 2009). Therefore, it 
is unclear whether the underlying cognitive process reflects effects of group status (high versus 
low, reflecting stereotypes that individuals high in racial status are also particularly moral) or 
group membership (ingroup versus outgroup, reflecting a perception that ingroup norms are 
particularly moral). Study 4 addressed these limitations by asking Black and White participants 
about their own perceptions of commonality and morality.   
Study 4: Is the strength of the association between commonality and morality stronger for 
a target person’s own racial group? 
Study 4 built on the results in Studies 1-3 by asking people to report their own judgments 
regarding commonality and morality rather than their expectations regarding others’ judgments. 
Further, Study 4 recruited both Black and White participants to expand the diversity of 
psychological science and further probe why group-based information may play a role in 
perceptions regarding morality and commonality.  
Participants. In an effort to test a more diverse sample, we recruited participants through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and Toolkit platforms, the latter of which allows for special sampling 
of pre-specified populations. A total of 127 participants completed the online survey.4 Twenty-
two of these participants were excluded for failing the same attention check questions as in Study 
3. Ten additional participants were excluded for not identifying as either White or Black. Of the 
95 participants remaining, 55% identified as female and 45% identified as male; 52% identified 
as White and 48% identified as Black. The mean age was 35 with a range of 22-68 years.5 
Participants received $0.67 for taking the 10-minute survey. 
                                                
4 We performed Study 4 first in this series of studies. Because we lacked results from the other studies in this paper 
on which to base an estimate of the expected effect size, we aimed for a final sample of 100 participants. 
5 As in Study 3, we re-ran analyses with age as a covariate and found that the results remained consistent. See 
Supplementary Materials.  
INGROUP AND OUTGROUP COMMONALITY AND MORALITY  
 
27 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 3, except that participants provided 
their own perceptions of the percent of White people and Black people who engage in 15 
different health behaviors (ranging from 0% to 100%) and the moral valence of each behavior 
(ranging from 1=extremely immoral to 9=extremely moral). We again included 35 filler 
questions asking about the percent of other demographic groups so as to distract from our 
interest in racial groups. Thus, for Black participants all answers about Black people served as 
ingroup information and all answers about White people served as outgroup information, 
whereas the reverse was true for White participants. The order of these questions was 
randomized within blocks, such that participants first rated perceptions of commonality of each 
behavior among each social category and then indicated how moral they perceived each behavior 
to be. After completing the survey, participants answered a few final demographic questions, 
were thanked, and received payment for their time. 
Results 
We used a similar statistical analysis as in Study 3. We regressed ratings of morality on a 
0/1 indicator variable for participant race (1=Black), a 0/1 indicator variable for group 
(1=ingroup), the percent of people perceived to perform behaviors (i.e. commonality), and an 
interaction term between group and estimated percents. The coefficient for the 0/1 race variable 
controlled for the effect of participant race. Since outgroup was coded as zero, the coefficient for 
the percent of people performing each behavior revealed the association between the perceived 
commonality of a behavior among the outgroup and perceived morality; a positive coefficient 
would suggest that participants perceived that behaviors that were more common among their 
outgroup were also more moral. The interaction term revealed the additional effect of ingroup 
commonality on perceptions of morality; a positive interaction term would again imply that the 
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strength of the association between commonality and morality was stronger for ingroup norms 
than for outgroup norms. We also ran a simple slopes analysis to determine whether the 
association between ingroup commonality and perceptions of morality significantly differed 
from zero.  
 Results can be found in Table 4, and a visualization can be found in Figure 4. Since 
between-person fixed effects in this setting are not entirely interpretable (e.g. we were not 
interested in differences in morality scores for people who rated all behaviors as more or less 
common than the group mean), we again represent and interpret only the within-person fixed 
effects. This model revealed an association between perceptions of commonality and morality 
that was again moderated by social groups. Participants indicated, on average, that a 10% 
increase in the percent of outgroup members who engaged in a behavior was associated with an 
increase of about 3 points out of 100 on the morality scale (b=0.27, p<.001). Simple slopes 
analyses also revealed an association between ingroup commonality and perceptions of morality. 
In this case, participants indicated, on average, that a 10% increase in the percent of ingroup 
members who engaged in a behavior was associated with an increase of about 4 points out of 100 
on the morality scale (b=0.38, p<.001). This association was significantly stronger than that 
between perceptions of outgroup commonality and morality (b=0.11, p=.014). In other words, 
the association between perceptions of commonality and morality was slightly positive for 
outgroup members and more positive for ingroup members. A simulated post-hoc sensitivity 
analytic approach (in the simR package) revealed that with 80% power, an alpha error rate of 
0.05, and a sample size of 95, we were only able to detect an effect as small as 0.125. The results 
should therefore be interpreted with some caution, as the effect that we observed was somewhat 
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smaller (b=0.11). Nonetheless, the consistency of these results with those of Studies 1-3 can 
increase confidence in these results.     
We also conducted a supplementary analysis examining whether race (participants 
answering questions about Black versus White individuals), rather than group membership 
(participants answering questions about ingroup versus outgroup members), explained the 
results. We did not find such an effect; see Supplementary Materials for additional details.  
Table 4: Multilevel Mixed Model, Study 4 
Fixed effects  
(intercept, slopes) 
Estimate SE t 
Intercept 46.08 1.28 36.3** 
Participant Race (1=Black) -1.47 1.69 -0.87 
Ingroup (1=yes) 0.58 1.02 0.56 
Percent  0.27 0.03 8.5** 





Figure 4: Association between the percent of people perceived to engage in a behavior and that 
behavior’s perceived morality, Study 4. Each line represents a model-predicted intercept and 
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 These data replicate and extend the findings from Study 3. Consistent with Study 3, 
Study 4 revealed a statistically reliable association between perceptions of commonality and 
morality that was stronger when participants answered questions about ingroup versus outgroup 
members. In other words, both Black and White participants perceived that behaviors that were 
more common among their outgroup were also more moral. However, this association was 
stronger for behaviors that they perceived as common among their ingroup. These findings again 
provide partial support for the perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis by showing that 
participants’ judgments depended less on perceptions of outgroup members. At the same time, 
these findings also provide partial support for the common is moral hypothesis, as the association 
between perceived commonality and perceived morality emerged for perceptions of both 
ingroups and outgroups to some extent. As in Study 3, we failed to find support for the group 
differentiation hypothesis, which would have predicted opposing effects for perceptions of 
ingroup versus outgroup members. 
These results echo the patterns obtained from a third-party perspective in Studies 1-3 and 
suggest that such findings generalize to a first-person perspective. This converging evidence 
strengthens the conclusion that norm-based judgments depend on group membership. 
General Discussion 
We investigated the extent to which people are sensitive to information about outgroup 
norms when inferring that common behaviors are moral and vice versa. Four studies tested 
between three theory-driven hypotheses. On the one hand, people’s judgments of commonality 
and morality could depend on both ingroup and outgroup norms. This could occur either as an 
extension of people’s sensitivity to behavioral frequency information in their social 
environments (i.e. the common is moral hypothesis, which implies that individuals perceive 
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behaviors that are common among more people to be the most moral) or as a way to further 
differentiate groups (i.e. the group differentiation hypothesis, which implies that behaviors that 
are common among a person’s ingroup but uncommon among that person’s outgroup are 
perceived to be the most moral). On the other hand, perceptions could be insensitive to outgroup 
norms, such that people pay attention mostly to commonality and morality among their ingroup 
(the perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis). This possibility stems from prior work showing 
that adults do not always align their behavior or attitudes with outgroup members (Smith & 
Louis, 2008; for slightly different results with children and adolescents suggesting that younger 
participants may attend more to outgroup norms, see McGuire, Manstead, & Rutland, 2017). 
Studies 1-2 provided strong support for the perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis. Studies 
3-4 provided some additional support for this hypothesis while also providing some evidence in 
favor of the common is moral hypothesis. Taken together, these results indicate that outgroup 
norms are less relevant than ingroup norms but do contribute to perceptions of ‘more common’ 
and therefore ‘more moral’ across groups.   
Theoretical Implications 
 As discussed above, results from Studies 1-2 supported the perceived outgroup 
irrelevance hypothesis. In Study 1, participants expected a target person to infer that behaviors 
that were common among that person’s ingroup were also moral, regardless of how common 
those behaviors were among that person’s outgroup. Study 2 tested the reverse causal pathway. 
Here, participants expected a target person to infer that behaviors were more common if that 
target’s ingroup perceived those behaviors as moral, regardless of moral perceptions among the 
target’s outgroup. These results support the perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis since 
outgroup norms seemed to have no impact on socio-moral cognition.  
INGROUP AND OUTGROUP COMMONALITY AND MORALITY  
 
32 
However, results from Studies 3-4 suggest that this conclusion should be tempered, as 
outgroup norms were associated with participants’ judgments to some extent, albeit not as much 
as ingroup norms. Participants expected others to perceive common behaviors as more moral 
(Study 3), and participants themselves also shared this perception (Study 4). This effect emerged 
when participants considered both ingroup and outgroup norms, although it was stronger in the 
former case. This finding suggests that outgroup norms may not be completely irrelevant in 
everyday contexts involving actual behaviors and social groups (as compared with fictitious 
behaviors and novel groups, as tested in Studies 1-2). Thus, these data partially support the 
common is moral hypothesis, as participants perceived (and expected others to perceive) more 
common behaviors to be more moral regardless of whether those behaviors were perceived as 
particularly common among ingroup or outgroup members. At the same time, ingroup norms 
were more strongly associated with participants’ judgments than outgroup norms. This result 
may have emerged because individuals typically perceive ingroup members as more similar to 
themselves than outgroup members (Imhoff & Dotsch, 2013) and may therefore find ingroup 
norms to be more informative for how they should behave and what they should believe. Thus, 
Studies 3-4 also provided some support for the perceived outgroup irrelevance hypothesis.  
Taken together, these results highlight the importance of generalizing experimental 
findings beyond the lab. If we only had data from Studies 1-2, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that support emerged only for the outgroup irrelevance hypothesis. The additional 
results from Studies 3-4 help to temper this conclusion by showing somewhat weaker support for 
this hypothesis in conjunction with some support for the common is moral hypothesis.    
 The fact that commonality and morality were bidirectionally linked from both a first- and 
third-party perspective contributes to the broader literature on moral cognition, which has 
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focused primarily on the influence of norms from one’s own perspective (for a notable 
exception, see Patil, Young, Sinay, & Gleichgerrcht, 2017). According to several theories of 
moral cognition, a defining feature of morality is the notion that moral norms are consistent for 
everyone, including the self and others (Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Smetana, 
2006; Turiel, 1978). Therefore, we tested the role of group membership both in people’s own 
judgments and in their expectations regarding others’ judgments. The fact that we found parallel 
results when asking people to make judgments on behalf of themselves and another person 
supports the idea that in the domain of morality, individuals may expect others to form similar 
judgments as those they themselves make. This process differs from prior results in other 
domains, in which people expected differences between their own and others’ judgments (e.g. 
Pronin, 2008). 
The current studies also add theoretical insight to the literature on group processes. By 
now, it is well known that people’s attitudes toward and evaluations of others depend on group 
membership (e.g. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Heiphetz & 
Young, 2019; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Tajfel et al., 1979). However, this work has paid 
less attention to the role that group membership may play in judgments that do not, on their face, 
appear to be about groups at all (e.g. how common particular behaviors are). Our results indicate 
that people’s norm-based judgments are more sensitive to information about members of their 
ingroup rather than their outgroup. In other words, participants appeared to judge—and expected 
others to judge—behaviors that were common among their ingroup to be more moral and 
behaviors that were more moral among their ingroup to be more common for everyone. 
However, information about how common or moral behaviors were among the perceiver’s 
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outgroup played a smaller role in social judgment. This set of findings is among the first to show 
the role that group-based information plays in cognition broadly construed.  
Translational Implications 
In addition to the theoretical contributions discussed above, these findings are likely to be 
useful as researchers, policy-makers, and advertisers increasingly utilize norm-based information 
to nudge behavior. In their pioneering work on norms and behavior, Cialdini and colleagues 
(1990) argued that people align their behaviors to mirror both what others actually do and what 
others should do, depending on which norm is salient. For example, a person who enters a clean 
environment is far less likely to litter than a person who enters a littered environment, suggesting 
that behavior is highly sensitive to common norms. Researchers have applied this influential 
finding to a number of contexts, including environmental behaviors (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), 
attitudes toward existential threat (Jonas et al., 2008; Louis & Taylor, 2002), and helping 
behavior (Bendapudi, Singh, & Bendapudi, 1996).  
The current studies suggest that these effects could depend on whether people perceive 
that an ingroup or an outgroup constitutes the norm. For example, people may be more likely to 
wear a face mask during a pandemic when they know or presume that their ingroup wears them. 
This idea is particularly relevant as this article goes to press in Summer 20206 and emerging 
public health messages frame health behaviors such as mask wearing as highly common among 
certain political groups (i.e. Democrats) and less so among others (i.e. Republicans; Gallup, 
2020). Our results imply that such group-based messaging is likely effective for the group(s) 
among whom the behavior is portrayed as common; however, such messages are likely less 
effective for the group(s) among whom the behavior is portrayed as uncommon. One potential 
                                                
6 We thank our action editor for suggesting that we discuss the implications of our findings for 
current events.  
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path forward is to highlight commonality among a larger group (e.g., to note that wearing masks 
is common among Americans).  
At the same time, the results from Studies 3-4 suggest that inferences between 
commonality and morality are not entirely constrained to the ingroup. This is an important 
finding in light of increasing racial diversity among protestors in the United States concerning 
police violence and systemic racism (Pew Research Center, 2020). Our results imply that diverse 
protests may change moral judgments among a greater number of people than protests that 
include primarily one group.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
In addition to the contributions the current work makes to psychological theories and 
practice, it also contains several limitations. The effect sizes are relatively small, which implies 
that commonality is unlikely to be the only factor influencing perceptions of morality and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, these effects emerged reliably across four studies, suggesting that the 
association between perceptions of commonality and morality is consistent and reliable, albeit 
stronger for the ingroup (for further discussion of the importance of small effect sizes, see 
Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Prentice & Miller, 1992).  
Additionally, we did not directly manipulate the status of the outgroup across all of our 
studies, and future work could test whether the status of the outgroup influences norm-based 
judgments. It could be that some types of group differences actually reverse the findings reported 
here. For instance, some research on benevolent sexism suggests that men may see women as 
particularly moral (Glick & Fiske, 2018). Future research should explore the boundary 
conditions of the effects presented here, including whether these effects are moderated by levels 
of ingroup identification (see Brewer, 2001), as prior research indicates that identity-relevance 
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plays a role in the relative importance of ingroup moral norms (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, 
& Matz, 2004).  
Finally, we recruited Amazon Mechanical Turk participants in our studies in order to 
obtain large samples. This choice allowed us to recruit a more diverse group of participants than 
sampling locally, including participants varying in age, geographical location, and race 
(particularly in Study 4). Future work can determine the extent to which the findings reported 
here generalize to individuals who are not represented by this sampling strategy, such as people 
who lack Internet access or people residing in other countries (see Roberts et. al, 2017 for 
generalizability and differences in the common-moral association across cultures).  
Conclusion 
Prior work has shown that people infer morality from commonality (Lindström et al., 
2018; Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2018; Roberts, Guo, Ho & Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & 
Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2019; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016) and visa versa 
(Eriksson et al., 2015). Furthermore, such judgments may depend on the norms (Abrams, 
Rutland & Cameron, 2003; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) and behaviors (Rhodes & Chalik, 2013; 
Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2018; Roberts, Guo, Ho & Gelman, 2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 
2017; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2019) of a person’s ingroup members. The current studies built 
on this research by investigating how people incorporate outgroup norms in these inferences. 
Four studies showed that people attend more to ingroup rather than outgroup norms when 
making judgments about commonality and morality and that they expect others to do the same. 
However, these effects emerged more reliably in controlled experimental contexts and were 
more nuanced in real-world contexts, where outgroup norms did matter to some extent, albeit 
less than ingroup norms. From a theoretical perspective, these findings imply that a strict 
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‘common is moral’ heuristic may need to be revised and that social group information moderates 
the effects of norm-based reasoning. From a translational perspective, these findings imply that 
efforts to nudge behavior based on norms should also incorporate information about the social 
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